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The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination in Article 1 of the 
Human Rights Covenants as a Claimable Right 
James Summers 
Lancaster University 
This article looks at the potential for individual communications under common article 1 of 
the Human Rights Covenants, in particular, under the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It first outlines the problems posed by the 
drafting of common article 1, in particular, the identity of peoples. It then considers how 
individuals might be able to claim peoples’ rights through representation and the 
collectivization of individual rights. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The legal implementation of the right of peoples to self-determination has always been
difficult. After the right was initially popularized in the period following the First World War, 
Sarah Wambaugh mused: “No group, however small, should be without its day in court.”1 
Legal mechanisms for claiming such a right, however, have proved far from straightforward. 
Many human rights treaties have mechanisms that allow individuals to bring claims over the 
violation of their rights. These procedures have been integral to enforcement of the regional 
European, Inter-American, and African systems and are also an option for the twin Human 
Rights Covenants. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has the 
most established and widely used communications procedure, with 116 parties to its Optional 
Protocol I 1966.2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(ICESCR) Optional Protocol 2008 is more recent and currently has 24 states parties.3 
The ability to bring a complaint over self-determination through such systems, however, 
is limited. Few human rights instruments actually proclaim such a right. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in articles 19–24, and the twin covenants, in common article 
1, are the only human rights treaties that do so. Moreover, while the individuals claiming a 
human rights violation are intended to be self-evident, the “peoples” claiming peoples’ rights 
are more ambiguous and contested. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), which implements 
the ICCPR, has effectively closed the door on individual communications under article 1 of 
that covenant. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which 
implements the ICESCR, by contrast, has not excluded the potential for communications 
under article 1 for its covenant, and this body forms the focus for this article. 
This article explores an obstacle that claims under article 1 inevitably face under the 
ICESCR Optional Protocol: how individuals can bring a claim on behalf of a people. It looks 
at the content of common article 1 and potential obstacles to communications that might arise 
from it. It examines the drafting of the article and practice by the two committees. It also 
draws from jurisprudence under the African Charter, the only regional human rights system to 
directly recognize peoples’ rights, and the Inter-American system, where they have been 
recognized indirectly. 
James Summers is a lecturer in law and director of the Centre for International Law and Human Rights at 
Lancaster University. 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
2 
The Two Committees and Rights in Article 1 of the Human Rights 
Covenants 
The right of peoples to self-determination in common article 1 of the human rights covenants 
differs from the other rights in the covenants in two ways. First, unlike the other covenant 
rights, which are individually focused, the article is held by a collective group, a people. 
Second, it is the only right common to the two covenants, though it could have different 
significance for each one. The first paragraph of the article reads: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
This statement reflects a division between political status, which can be freely determined, 
and economic, social, and cultural development, which can be freely pursued, reflecting a 
distinction between civil and political and economic, social, and cultural rights. The economic 
aspects of self-determination are then expanded on in the second paragraph, through a right to 
dispose of resources:  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
The right to resources in article 1(2) is phrased in qualified terms as a balance of five 
interconnected elements.4 The right of peoples to dispose of their resources is subject to 
obligations from international economic cooperation, the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. The drafting left the content of each of these elements and their relationship 
ambiguous,5 though they can be seen essentially to frame a relationship between states or 
between states and investors.6 The last sentence provides that regardless of this balance, 
peoples are not to be deprived of their means of subsistence, which suggests a relationship 
between a state’s government and its people. This provision reflects an ultimate guarantee to 
prevent, as the Saudi representative explained at the time, “a weak or penniless government 
from seriously compromising a country’s future by granting concessions in the economic 
sphere—a frequent occurrence in the nineteenth century.”7 While deprivation of means of 
subsistence, like other elements in article 1(2), was never defined, this provision underlines 
an intention for it to provide a basic level of economic protection. Moreover, one of the few 
examples cited to illustrate the provision, the removal of a tribe from their ancestral land in 
Tanganyika, also suggests a relationship between a government and communities within a 
state or a similar territory.8  
Although the content of paragraph 2 was never clarified, another ambiguity in article 1 
posed an even greater challenge to its implementation—the identity of the peoples who held 
the right. While the inclusion of the article was inspired by the then ongoing decolonization 
process and justified on the basis that self-determination was the prerequisite for human 
rights, it was less clear how individuals related to a people as a collective group. The concept 
of peoples was subject to competing claims and some of those envisioned the break-up of 
states. Article 1, unlike other provisions on self-determination, does not explicitly protect the 
territorial integrity of states. It does so implicitly.9 Nonetheless, the right could be seen as an 
existential threat by many states’ parties and this possibility of secession has made it a 
difficult right for the HRC and CESCR to implement. 
These difficulties have expressed themselves most decisively in the practice of the HRC. 
This committee can receive communications from individuals over potential violations of 
ICCPR rights by states parties to its Optional Protocol I. But the HRC quickly took the 
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position that the rights in article 1 were not available for individual communication and has 
consistently maintained this stance.10 This was the only instance where the committee refused 
to receive communications over a right in the covenant. 
The issues behind this refusal—controversy over the identity of peoples and the scope of 
self-determination—were evident in the first communication brought under the protocol. In A. 
D. v. Canada (Mikmaq Tribal Society) the grand captain of the society asserted that Canada 
had denied self-determination for the Mikmaq people and insisted that “the Mikmaq nation be 
recognised as a State.”11 The committee dismissed this claim in 1984 on the grounds that the 
author had not shown himself to be the authorized representative of the society.12 This 
decision, committee member Roger Errera noted, left open whether the Mikmaq constituted a 
“people” and whether self-determination could be claimed by individuals.13 In Kitok v. 
Sweden (1988), however, the committee simply adopted the stand that individuals cannot 
claim to be victims of a breach of article 1,14 a stance it has consistently maintained.15 The 
committee also explained that this position meant that it did not need to address whether the 
groups in question were peoples.16 The committee’s approach on the article is more restrictive 
than the actual wording of Optional Protocol I, which provides for the committee’s 
competence over communications on “any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”17 It also 
sat uncomfortably with the committee’s finding in General Comment No. 12 (1984) that self-
determination was “essential . . . for the effective guarantee of observance of individual rights 
and for promotion and strengthening of those rights.”18 The committee has subsequently 
recognized a role for article 1 in the interpretation of other covenant rights. These are the 
rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities in article 2719 and 
rights to vote and participate in government in article 25.20 Nonetheless, the effect of this 
interpretative role has been marginal because there has been little clarification on what article 
1 actually contributes to those articles. 
The context in the ICESCR is somewhat different. The framework for individual 
communications under this covenant developed much later than the ICCPR. In contrast to 
civil and political rights, which could be immediately violated by state actions, it was 
questioned whether economic and social rights, which are progressively realized, lend 
themselves to a communications procedure. Nevertheless, an individual communications 
procedure was established in the ICESCR Optional Protocol 2008, which entered into force in 
2013. Article 2 of the protocol allows communications over “a violation of any of the 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant.” This phrase has significance 
for article 1 because by being narrower than the equivalent provision in the ICCPR Protocol it 
provides a focus for potential claims. The CESCR in drafting the protocol was conscious of 
the danger of being seen to encourage secession21 but also reluctant to follow the restrictive 
stance of the HRC.22 The solution was that “only the economic, social and cultural aspects of 
the right to self-determination could be the subject of communications.”23 This narrowed 
focus not only followed the committee’s mandate but enabled them to avoid the difficult 
political questions that fell more squarely within the scope of the HRC. Conversely, this focus 
allowed the committee to concentrate on the economic, social, and cultural role of peoples’ 
rights in the covenant. Committee member Philip Alston in a discussion on the protocol cited 
the protection of a people’s means of subsistence as an example of how self-determination 
relates to economic, social, and cultural rights.24 Thus, the Optional Protocol creates the 
potential for communications against states parties under article 1 within an economic, social, 
and cultural context. 
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The Authors of Communications and Connections between Individual and 
Peoples’ Rights 
Potential article 1 communications under the ICESCR Optional Protocol necessarily raise the 
issue of the connection between peoples’ rights and the individuals who bring the 
communication, a relationship that has remained unresolved since Mikmaq Tribal Society. 
Individuals certainly form the collective groups known as “peoples,” but peoples’ rights are 
exercised by the group as a whole, not by particular individuals. Individuals have been able to 
bring complaints over violations of peoples’ rights in a relatively small number of cases under 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Individuals and organizations have 
successfully raised peoples’ rights violations for groups within states—in the Southern 
Cameroons, Darfur, and for the Ogoni, the Endrois, and the Ogiek. But there is a crucial 
difference in the African system. The African Charter does not require the authors of a 
communication to be the actual victim of a violation of one of its rights.25 Thus, there is no 
obstacle to individuals’ raising a peoples’ rights violation that can then be judged on its own 
merits. 
By contrast, both the ICECR Optional Protocol and the ICCPR Optional Protocol require 
authors of a communication to be the “victim” of a breach of the right in the relevant 
covenant.26 Article 2 of the ICESCR Optional Protocol refers to claims “by or on behalf of 
individuals or groups of individuals” that are “claiming to be victims of a violation” of the 
covenant’s rights.27 This provision requires a specific connection between peoples’ rights and 
the rights of individuals claiming a breach of those rights. If a clear distinction is maintained 
between collective rights and individual rights then the two simply do not connect. The HRC 
has essentially taken this position. 
If the collective nature of peoples’ rights does not form an insurmountable barrier to 
individual communication, however, there needs to be a way to connect them. There are two 
potential ways to link individuals to peoples’ rights. The first is representation. Article 2 
allows communications “on behalf of” a “group of individuals,” which might equate to a 
people, with their consent, unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such 
consent. Individuals might be able to bring claims over peoples’ rights if they have this 
consent. In self-governing communities, essentially indigenous and tribal peoples, there may 
be leaders who can express the relevant consent, either individually or by a delegation. This 
authority was partially addressed in Mikmaq Tribal Society, because the inability of the 
author to show himself as the authorized representative of the society led to the rejection of 
the communication.28 Whether an individual could demonstrate this authority was left open in 
the later, Lubicon Lake decision. In this communication, an alleged article 1 violation was 
raised by Bernard Ominayak, chief of the Lubicon Lake Band, who was described as the 
band’s “leader and representative.”29 The HRC, though, did not engage with this issue; it 
simply dismissed individual claims over article 1 in their entirety.30 Thus, the issue of 
representation remains to be decided. 
The second approach would be to treat peoples’ rights as collective counterparts to 
individually framed rights. This approach requires establishing a nexus between peoples’ 
rights and the other rights in the covenant so that a violation of those rights would determine a 
breach of article 1. Such a connection can be seen in African jurisprudence. In COHRE v. 
Sudan (2009) the “nature and magnitude” of a violation of economic, social, and cultural 
rights and other individual rights in Darfur supported a violation of the peoples’ right to 
development in article 22 of the charter.31 Likewise, in Ogoniland (2001) widespread human 
rights violations were cited as contributing to a breach of the right to dispose of resources in 
article 21 of the charter.32 Alternatively, in Endorois (2009) and Ogiek Community (2017) the 
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peoples’ right to resources drew from a communal interpretation of the right to property, 
which was itself based on the traditions of the group.33 
The protection of means of subsistence provides an obvious potential nexus between 
economic and social rights and article 1. The CESCR made such a connection in relation to 
the right to water in General Comment No. 15. The committee called on states parties to 
“ensure that there is adequate access to water for subsistence farming and for securing the 
livelihoods of indigenous peoples” under article 1(2).34 Moreover, this connection might not 
be limited just to the right to water but might encompass other aspects of the right to an 
adequate standard of living in article 11 of the ICESCR, including the right to food35 and 
housing36 and the right to health.37 CESCR in General Comment No. 21 also emphasized the 
importance of respect for rights to land and resources in protecting the right to culture for 
indigenous communities.38  
This nexus also corresponds to jurisprudence in regional systems that has addressed 
either peoples’ rights or a communal interpretation of individual rights. There is an overlap 
between the two. The survival of an indigenous community was a crucial element in the a 
communal interpretation of the right to property developed by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in its landmark Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua case (2001).39 The 
court identified three aspects to “survival”—physical, cultural, and intergenerational—and in 
later cases treated the concept as interchangeable with “subsistence.”40 Physical survival 
involved protecting the land and resources necessary for the physical integrity of an 
indigenous community, such as food, water, housing, and medicinal plants.41 Cultural 
survival focused on the necessary resources for spiritual ties,42 while intergenerational 
survival concerned the transmission of culture to future generations.43 The African 
Commission in Endorois built on this jurisprudence, with physical and cultural survival once 
again equated with subsistence,44 providing the touchstone for both a communal 
interpretation of the right to property45 and the peoples’ right to resources.46  
Survival has also defined the conditions for legitimate interference with those rights. In 
Inter-American and African cases involving resources, interference required consultation, 
which needed to be timely, conducted in good faith with the aim to achieve consent, based on 
respect for local institutions and informed by social and environmental-impact assessment.47 
This approach corresponds with standards supported by the CESCR in relation to the 
exploitation of resources under article 1. The committee considered that consultation in those 
circumstances should be (1) timely, with “sufficient time and opportunity to reflect and take a 
decision,”48 (2) inclusive, reflecting the traditions and culture of the community,49 (3) 
informed by a human rights and environmental impact assessment,50 and (4) effective, though 
the role of consent has varied.51  
The two approaches to connecting individual claimants with peoples’ rights emphasize 
different aspects of a group. The first focuses on the leadership of a community and the 
second on the rights of its individual members. While these two approaches could 
complement each other, there is also potential for conflict between them. 
Practice by the HRC on communications over article 27 of the ICCPR has pointed to the 
potential for different interpretations of rights within sections of an indigenous community. In 
Apirina Mahuika v. New Zealand (2000), the authors represented seven tribes (iwi) within the 
Maori people who objected to a memorandum of understanding that had been agreed to by a 
majority of tribes with the government.52 They raised their objections under the right to 
resources in article 1, though the committee considered it only as a minority rights issue 
under article 27. The committee considered that there might be circumstances in which 
individuals belonging to a minority within a group might be considered separately, but there 
needed to be “reasonable and objective justification” to do so.53 In Paadar v. Finland (2014), 
the authors, who were Sami reindeer herders, alleged a violation of article 27 read with article 
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1 due to common limits on the number of reindeer across two communities. They argued that 
different natural conditions and higher exposure to predators meant that those limits 
disproportionately affected them. The committee as a whole concluded that it did not have 
sufficient information to determine a breach.54 A dissenting opinion by four members argued, 
however, that a reasonable and objective justification necessary for the continued viability 
and welfare of the minority did not support those measures.55 
Further guidance can also be found in the Inter-American Court’s decision in Saramaka 
v. Suriname (2005). In this case, Suriname argued that the authors of the complaint had not
been authorized to represent the Saramaka people by its paramount leader, the Gaa’man. The 
court, however, dismissed this objection under the principle of effectiveness, which meant 
that the authority to make communications needed to be interpreted broadly.56 This decision 
might support a broader approach to the individuals who might be able to represent a 
community. 
Conclusion 
Self-determination remains a controversial right, and ambiguities in the drafting of the human 
rights covenants have created problems for the HRC and CESCR. These ambiguities have led 
the HRC to refuse to accept individual communications under article 1. The CESCR, though, 
has indicated that it could consider article 1 communications within an economic, social, and 
cultural context. This still leaves the issue of the connection between individual complainants 
and peoples’ rights violation to be resolved. The ICESCR Optional Protocol requires that 
communications are brought by or on behalf of a victim of a right, but individuals may not 
necessarily connect to such rights. There are two possible approaches to such a connection. 
First, representatives of a people could give consent to the communication. Second, an 
overlap might be found between individual economic, social, and cultural rights and peoples’ 
rights. The protection of a peoples’ means of subsistence provides the most obvious 
connection. Moreover, while drawing from individual rights, this approach is not duplicative. 
Article 1(2) focuses on the right to resources, which in the context of indigenous communities 
has meant the protection of property rights. Neither covenant contains a specific right to 
property, so making article 1 available to communications partially fills this gap. Moreover, 
the deprivation of a people’s means of subsistence reflects the gravity of some violations of 
economic and social rights, depriving a community of its means of support. As such, the 
availability of article 1 to individual communications could serve an important role in 
strengthening the ICESCR. 
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